Over the last decade, there has been an ongoing revolution in the exploration, manipulation, and synthesis of biological systems, through the development of new technologies that generate, analyse and exploit big data. Users of Plant Genetic Resources (PGR) can potentially leverage these capacities to significantly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their efforts to conserve, discover and utilise novel qualities in PGR, and help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This review advances the discussion on these emerging opportunities and discusses how taking advantage of them will require data integration and synthesis across disciplinary, organisational and international boundaries, and the formation of multi-disciplinary, international partnerships. We explore some of the institutional and policy challenges that these efforts will face, particularly how these new technologies may influence the structure and role of research for sustainable development, ownership of resources, and access and benefit sharing. We discuss potential responses to political and institutional challenges, ranging from options for enhanced structure and governance of research discovery platforms to internationally brokered benefit-sharing agreements, and identify a set of broad principles that could guide the global community as it seeks or considers solutions.
accession, or a number of accessions to be ascertained and accurately quantified. This can better inform 118 the quality control, maintenance, distribution, and use of gene bank stocks. Moreover, extensive 119 genotyping, linked to measured traits, allows repositories to be searched for strains containing desired 120 genetic elements and/or trait characteristics, and the production of new products that improve the 121 sustainability, diversity, and resilience of crop plants, which is particularly important given the urgent 122 need to feed and nourish a growing global population in the face of substantial change to the natural 123
environment. 124
Integrating big data into breeding programs 125
Generating sequence information per se is no longer a bottleneck for crop improvement. Phenotypic 126 characterisation has historically been more problematic, but increasingly, molecular phenotypes (e.g. 127 gene expression and ion content) can be used as indicators of physiological or performance phenotypes, 128 while quantitative imaging techniques using remote sensing can directly measure plant architectural and 129 stress response characteristics in a variety of experimental set-ups (e.g. automated greenhouse and field 130 settings under drone surveillance). Statistical models can be constructed to predict the breeding value of 131 an individual, given its genomic composition (genomic selection); and an optimal breeding scheme can 132 be designed in the light of such predictions. Genomic selection has been associated with major 133 performance gains in livestock species, and it has similar potential in plant species. Accurate prediction 134 is enhanced not only by access to more data, but to more variation in the data -which means sampling 135 the gene pool as extensively as possible, and assaying under the widest range of environmental 136 conditions. If information can be collected, it is possible that the method will develop sufficient power to 137 accurately predict G x E (Genotype x Environment) interactions, allowing for the development of specific 138 crops tailored to particular environmental conditions. Dedeurwaerdere (2013, p. 369) notes that, the 139 "information technology revolution has dramatically expanded the possibilities of distributed 140 coordination …" in the use of genetic resources. Indeed, the increasing generation and use of big data by 141 farmers themselves (both as inputs into and outputs generated by agronomic decisions) could 142 potentially create a huge reservoir of knowledge about plant performance (including stress tolerance, 143 nutritional quality and overall yield) in a far wider range of climates, soils, and management regimes 144 than could be tested by a single breeder, research team, or organisation (Satizábal et al., 2012; van 145 Etten et al., 2016, 2017) . This information, if made available to breeders and biological engineers, has 146 great potential to feedback into further improvement programmes. A more formal and extensive 147 partnership between farmers, researchers and other actors to facilitate the flow of information stands 148 to substantially enhance benefits to the variety of plant genetic resources stakeholders. 149
Technologies for identifying and creating genetic variation 150

Molecular marker (genomics)-assisted germplasm curation, research and breeding 151
All crop improvement practices aim to capture (within elite lines) genetic variants that confer desirable 152 traits. The ability to accurately identify and track genome-wide genetic variation or individual molecular 153 variants across generations of individuals offers a powerful tool for germplasm managers, basic 154 researchers, and plant breeders (Collard & Mackill, 2008; McCouch et al., 2012) . For example, gene bank 155 managers utilise molecular markers to establish and validate the identity of accessions in their 156 collections, to determine genetic relationships among individuals, to perform gap analysis to guide 157 collecting efforts, and for allele mining to identify accessions that carry particular alleles (traits) of 158 interest. Basic biological researchers use genomic and other "omics" analyses to characterise the 159 structure, function, and evolutionary significance of genes and alleles, to study plant development and 160 response to environment, and to understand speciation and the implications of diversity at the 161 individual, population and ecosystem levels. Applied breeding programs use molecular marker data to 162 identify parents for crossing, to select offspring carrying favourable or deleterious alleles in segregating 163 populations, and to perform genomic prediction. 164
Genetic and genome engineering 165
Since the 1980s it has been possible to randomly insert new genetic material into the genomes of plants. 166 The first genetically modified crops to be commercialised were tomatoes with extended shelf life (1994), 167 insect resistant potatoes (1995), herbicide (glyphosate) resistant soy (1996) and virus resistant papayas 168 (1998). Genetically modified crops are now grown on 181.5 million hectares of land, by 18 million 169 farmers (Stevenson et al., 2013; James, 2014) . In the past decade or so, emerging technologies (such as 170 programmable nucleases, e.g. zinc finger nucleases and RNA-guided Cas9 [i.e. CRISPR-associated protein 171 9] from bacterial CRISPR systems) have enabled so-called precision genome engineering (or genome 172 editing): the induction of targeted modifications to the genome, its contexts (e.g. epigenetic marks) or 173 its outputs (e.g. transcripts) (Schiml & Puchta, 2016; Petolino et al., 2016) . Targeted genome 174 modifications include the induction of mutations at pre-selected loci to disrupt the function of one or 175 more specific genes; the editing of existing sequences to reproduce ancient alleles or to introduce novelpossible to change DNA modifications, such as methylation, in order to modulate gene expression. 178
When coupled with the ability to chemically synthesise DNA molecules at ever diminishing costs, 179 genome engineering may enable multiple novel variations to be designed and tested at any desired 180 genetic locus, including in multifactorial combinations (Puchta, 2017) . 181
Although some of these technologies are still inefficient and difficult to execute, they are being 182 developed for numerous food and non-food crops, and progress continues apace. Genome engineering 183 and synthetic biology technologies have the potential to vastly reduce the time taken for knowledge 184 generated in the laboratory to transition into marketable products by allowing the direct introduction of 185 favourable alleles into agronomically valuable germplasm, thus reducing the number of breeding cycles 186 required. One day, this may mean that it is possible for a farmer to request that a targeted set of 187 changes be made to a highly valued cultivar as part of the breeding process. In response, a new genetic 188 trait or combination of genetic characteristics could be rapidly designed and introduced into a cultivar to 189 improve its resilience to stress, nutritional quality or architectural characteristics, making it a better fit 190 for either the traditional cropping system or the modern agricultural landscape. These applications have 191 the potential to bypass the direct use of specific physical host plants that may have played an important 192 role in identifying the novel traits, with wide ranging implications for owners, managers and users of 193
PGR. 194
Information technologies underpinning plant genetic resources 195
Information technology has played as important a role as genomic technology in the evolution of crop 196 improvement strategies. The ongoing improvement in the performance of computers, driven by the 197 ever-increasing miniaturisation of transistors, was noted by Moore as long ago as 1965 (Moore, 1965) . 198
Subsequently, the development of many other aspects of computer hardware (parallelisation, storage, 199 networking, etc.) has enabled, and also been driven by, the data revolution in almost every field of 200 study. In particular, the development of the Internet, the World Wide Web, and the explosive growth in 201 mobile communications networks, have put much of this computing power and the data that lies behind 202 it in the hands of citizens worldwide, including those interested in PGR (scientists, breeders, farmers, 203 and consumers). However, much of the relevant data is highly dispersed, has limited compatibility, and 204 is in practice hard to interpret except by specialists. 205
Apps are computer programmes that have been optimised for a particular purpose, and commonly used 206 on mobile computing devices. Compared with traditional tools, apps are often simple to use, and each 207 one developed to address a specific, limited, well-defined use case, frequently by opportunistic 208 entrepreneurs and social entrepreneurs (the barriers to entry in the app development market are 209 relatively low). Increasingly, such apps are in use by farmers, even in low and middle-income countries, 210 to source seeds and other agricultural inputs, improve agronomic and pest management practices, and 211 optimise market decisions. The provision of information about the genetics and performance of crop 212 varieties in particular environments through apps could assist farmers in the selection of varieties 213 appropriate to their conditions and cropping systems. Moreover, the collection, by farmers, of detailed 214 measurements of the actual environments in which crops are grown could enable the development of 215 more precise and sophisticated modelling of G x E interactions. The potential for such advances, while 216 holding tremendous promise, is still largely untapped. Commercial users of material accessed under the multi-lateral system are obliged to make financial 312 payments to an international benefit-sharing fund under prescribed circumstances. To date, no 313 obligatory payments have been made under this system. In turn, some potential material providers are 314 not following through on commitments to make genetic resources available through the system. These 315 lapses led to the launch, in 2013, of a process for enhancing the multilateral system of access and 316 benefit sharing through renegotiation of its basic terms. If and when agreed, these new terms will be 317 reflected in a revised Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA). 318
It is important to note that the CBD, its Nagoya Protocol, and the ITPGRFA link benefit-sharing 319 obligations to accessing and using physical material containing functional units of heredity (e.g. seeds 320
and cuttings). They do not specifically regulate access to digital data, e.g. genomic sequence or 321 phenotypic data (see Notes S2). All three agreements refer to digital research data as a potential benefit 322 to be shared in return for access to genetic resources. In fact, all three agreements were negotiated 323 without much discussion or debate about how ongoing technological breakthroughs (e.g. sequencing, 324 phenotyping, and bioinformatics) might eventually make it possible to take advantage of genetic 325 resources without the need to access the physical resources. Thus, even if the agreements were to 326 operate as intended, they would not directly address concerns that use of open-access sequence data 327
(and other related big data) will make it possible to profit from the use of genetic resources without 328 benefit-sharing obligations (see Notes S3). 329
In light of this recent history, it is perhaps not surprising that some country and regional representatives, 330 civil society and farmers' organisations have voiced concerns that technological breakthroughs in 331 genomic breeding, gene editing, and gene synthesis will widen the technology gap, and concomitant 332 economic disparities, between developed and developing countries. They worry that these 333 breakthroughs will exacerbate tensions associated with the unrealised expectations of monetary 334 benefits accruing from access and benefit sharing laws. These stakeholders note that at present the 335 requisite technological capacities principally reside in elite research institutions in the global North. They 336 are sceptical that these new capacities will be used to develop technologies targeted at resource-poor 337 farmers working in vulnerable agricultural systems. This has led to demands (by some civil society 338 organisations and developing countries) that research organisations stop providing unregulated open 339 access to genetic sequence data until benefit sharing issues can be addressed (Hammond, 2016 governed -to transcend some of those long-standing tensions. This is partly because they make it 374 possible to engage a broader range of interested parties in the research and development process in 375 ways that are economically efficient, practical, and attuned to non-market considerations. For example, 376 they can radically lower the costs of local level needs assessments and facilitate crowd-sourced farmer 377 evaluation of materials across a broad range of agro-ecosystems. 378
Of course, these are not entirely new questions. Over the course of the last 30 years, there have been a 379 number of studies, from a range of theoretical perspectives, analysing the influence of organisational 380 structures on agricultural research and development in general, and more particularly on efforts to 381 conserve, add value to, share and exploit PGR. Many of those studies were conducted before the recent 382 increases in technological capacities outlined above; nonetheless, they can still provide useful insights. 383
Modular architecture for commons-based production 384
Dedeurwaerdere (2013) considers a range of case studies of 'commons-based production' of public 385 goods in whole genome sequencing, wheat breeding, animal breeding programmes, and research on 386 root nodule bacteria for use in soy bean production. He concludes that many of the most successful 387 programs have been characterised by "modular architectures" which allow the pooling of input from 388 many individuals from diverse backgrounds, focus and geographical location. By extension, the 389 innovation systems through which these goods are produced necessarily require the inputs of many 390 actors, none of whom can act alone. Dedeurwaerdere notes a second common feature in successful 391 case studies: a critical density of the actors participating in the commons-based production efforts are 392 motivated by non-market incentives, for example, recognition by scientific peers, access to funding, 393 commitment to sustainable development, biodiversity conservation, or other broader social goals. 394
Furthermore, the goods produced through these modular architectures of commons-based production, 395 e.g. improved breeding lines and whole genome sequences, tend to be treated as pre-commercial. That 396 is not to say that information commons are exclusive of private interests or linkages to further 397 development of appropriable, commercial goods; indeed, such linkages frequently exist, but the goods 398 are not generated exclusively for this purpose. 
Strengthening network ties for innovation and policy development 498
The 'modular architectures' described above are conceptually similar to what is known in network 499 theory as a collaborative innovation network. Networks come in many forms, but fundamentally 500 comprised of actors and relations. Actors, referred to as nodes in network theory, are differentiated by 501 influence (e.g. power, prestige) and relationships vary along an informal-formal continuum. 502
Properly functioning, participatory networks foster trust, largely through the formation of social capital. 503
Local actors, particularly farmers and community organisations, currently enjoy relatively little social 504 capital in existing PGRFA networks. Access to influential non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 505 scientific knowledge networks, and direct linkages to financial stakeholders could substantially expand 506 the social capital of local stakeholders and, importantly, enhance trust within the network. 507
Overcoming the barriers to trust, and the divergence of interest, between the different actors interested 508 in PGFRA is central for accelerating the development of improved crops. However, it will require new 509 models of scientific practice that redefine the traditional top-down (hierarchical) models that have 510 dominated the field. Greater engagement with stakeholders who have traditionally been implicitly or 511 explicitly viewed as passive, peripheral participants in the larger innovation process is critical if we are to 512 break out of the current situation where material-sharing is in decline and benefit-sharing is not 513 apparent. 514
We briefly mention two types of networks that could inform the structure and modus operandi of new 515 genetic resources or bioinformatics-based innovation platforms. Peer network academies (Klerkx & 516 Leeuwis, 2009) represent a high-value collaborative network hub due to their focus on networks of 517 stakeholders that share common interests (e.g. corn, rice, dairy, and poultry in the agricultural industry). 518
Two key features of a peer network academy organised around PGRFA are an online databank, which 519 can serve as a clearinghouse of essential information, including germplasm input systems linking to 520 larger data repositories, and a collaborative structure in which farmers are active participants in 521 knowledge discovery by virtue of their fields functioning as demonstration farms (citizen scientists). 522
A second type of network model to be considered in this context is that of Collaborative Innovation 523
Networks (CoINs). CoINs facilitate inter-network collaborations that span traditional social, economic, 524
and cultural hierarchies and boundaries to encourage direct communication between actors that have 525 traditionally had little or no direct communication and collaboration (Gloor, 2006) . They are 526 characterised by a widely dispersed but interdependent membership working toward common goals in 527 an environment of trust. A hallmark of CoINs is their lack of central management, which allows broadly-528 based transparent interactions among network actors. However, new innovation platforms will likely (at 529 least initially) require investment in more centralised governance mechanisms to identify and promote 530 shared goals and trust among the range of actors that we underscore need to be involved. Of course, 531 some of the 'modules' of the innovation platform could embrace CoINs-inspired structures and modus 532 operandi, and over time the proportion of such activities related to the innovation platform could 533 increase. 534
To address hierarchical organisational structures and concentrated power among elite actors involved in 535 genetic resources or bioinformatics-based innovation platforms, we suggest two possible approaches. 536
Farmers, especially those in developing countries, will need a seat at the table that is not merely 537 symbolic, but functional. Redefining farmers as citizen-scientists filling an integral role in field 538 experimentation and data generation as part of a modular, commons-based innovation system holds 539 tremendous potential to overcome the historical backdrop of mistrust between local stakeholders and 540 elites working in agri-business, science, and public policy. Also, data generating systems could and 541 should link field data, germplasm information, and relevant metadata in a manner that moves farmers 542 from the end of the conventional agricultural research extension pipeline ) to a 543 central, co-equal role in the PGR collaborative innovation network. Farmers (and the system as a whole) 544 should benefit from being able to develop new, collaborative linkages with scientists, civil society 545 organisations, and agri-industry groups. Such a data network would require feedback loops that 546 facilitate not only the transmission of information into large-scale data repositories (e.g. genetic 547
sequence, phenomic, environmental, and GIS data) but also cycle information back out to the field in an 548 open and transparent manner that engenders trust, furthers cooperation, and produces equitable 549 benefits across the network. Complementary capacity strengthening is necessary to promote the ability 550 of farmers organisations and resource-poor national agricultural research and extension services to take 551 advantage of these networks. 552
Access and benefit sharing and big data
553
As highlighted above, much of the support for international access and benefit sharing (ABS) laws came 554 from developing countries who were (and are) concerned about existing inequities in the distribution of 555 benefits derived from commercial use of genetic resources. If institutionalised, the modular, inclusive, 556 governance mechanisms described above could help allay concerns that the new bioinformatics 557 capacities will exacerbate those inequities. To increase the likelihood of this positive outcome, 558 organisations seeking to catalyse new genetic resources/bioinformatics-based innovation platforms 559 should promote best practices and develop voluntary standards explicitly addressing ABS issues. 560
Demonstrable compliance with these standards could be a precondition of endorsement by innovation 561 platform(s) of project proposals prepared for donors, or projects in which platforms engage directly. The 562 advantage of this approach to developing ABS standards and best practices is that they can be 563 developed organically, building on existing practices and reciprocal interests of the actors involved. In 564 this way, they could be sufficiently flexible to take into account the very different motivations of the 565 very different groups of actors, and the wide range of both non-monetary and monetary benefits that 566 can be generated. 567
Meanwhile, as discussed above, the issue of sharing benefits derived from the use of genetic sequence 568 data has already made its way onto a number of international agendas, with developing regions calling 569 Advisory Group and a specialized technical working group are considering options for benefit sharing 576 linked to the sharing and commercial use of gene sequence data of influenza viruses with human 577 pandemic potential (see Notes S2). On one hand, there is clearly a need for novel approaches to 578 promote both monetary and non-monetary benefit sharing. On the other hand, we are concerned that 579 discussions at the level of the United Nations have historically tended to focus almost exclusively on 580 monetary benefit-sharing (largely overlooking ways to promote valuable forms of non-monetary 581 benefit-sharing). 582
As the summary of the last 30 years of international policy making above underscores, it is challenging 583 to develop globally applicable, legally binding ABS norms that are custom fit for emerging areas of 584 scientific practice. There is a risk that new efforts at the level of the United Nations to develop a one-585 size-fits-all, ABS policy solution with respect to genomic sequence data could inadvertently end-up 586 perpetuating disincentives for sharing, accessing, and using genetic resources and information (including 587 genomic sequence data). New rules, if inappropriately crafted, could inadvertently create barriers to the 588 development of innovation platforms and enhanced governance arrangements as described above. In 589 the following paragraphs, we briefly consider a range of options regarding new ABS policies that are, 590 have been, or could be, considered by these intergovernmental bodies. This is not meant to constitute a 591 thorough analysis of ongoing negotiations; only to provide an introductory insight into the kinds of 592 benefit sharing 'solutions' that are actively under consideration in those fora. 593
Perhaps the lightest-weight option would be for one, or some combination, of those international 594 bodies to opt for a 'soft' norm approach, without the creation of new, legally binding obligations. This 595 approach could involve identifying and endorsing best practices, developing voluntary guidelines and 596 model ABS agreements. It could also include self-reporting mechanisms through which new innovation 597 platforms could report on their management structures, guiding principles, partnerships and activities, 598 and seek endorsements from relevant international bodies. 599
Another approach would entail extending the scope of the Nagoya Protocol and the ITPGRFA to apply to 600 genome sequence and other types of digital data related to PGR, in addition to material genetic 601 resources. Under the ITPGRFA, this would entail data owners and curators agreeing to provide 602 facilitated access to data sets subject to the condition that if that information was 'incorporated' (orpayments to the Benefit-Sharing Fund (BSF). Under the predominant model for national implementation 605 of Nagoya, parties seeking access to a database containing genome sequence or other PGR-related 606 digital data would need to negotiate an ABS agreement, which could include any number of conditions. 607
The same mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with ABS agreements for material 608 genetic resources would be extended to trace and enforce agreements related to digital PGR-associated 609 data. Unfortunately, as highlighted above, these contract-based, track-and-trace ABS systems are 610 already proving to be very difficult to implement given the non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature of 611 material genetic resources. Controlling access to information -given that it is already so diffused, easily 612 copied, and easily moved through the Internet -would be even more difficult, as would be tracking and 613 tracing the use of that information in the development of a discrete, new, commercialised crop variety 614 or patented trait. One can imagine the adoption of such a model eventually leading to collapse of the 615 ABS systems that the international community has been working to develop since the CBD came into 616 force. On the other hand, perhaps the technological breakthroughs that have created enhanced interest 617 and value for genetic sequence information could also be deployed in enhanced systems for monitoring 618 and verifying uses of those data. 619
A more pragmatic variation of the contract approach that is currently being considered under the 620 ITPGRFA framework is to create a subscription system for accessing both genetic resources and 621 sequence data, and for sharing related monetary benefits. Under this system, commercial users (or 622 governments representing clusters of commercial users) would commit to making annual payments to 623 the BSF, based on their annual seed sales, for a fixed period (e.g. ten years). During that time, they 624 would have facilitated access to both genetic resources in the multilateral system and also genetic 625 sequence data. Since the rate of payment is based on seed sales generally, there would be no need to 626 track and trace the use of the material genetic resources or sequence data in the creation of new 627 products. This model is attractive in that it could generate more predictable levels of funding. It would 628 also simultaneously address ABS commitments for both genetic resources and digital sequence data, 629 and in a way that significantly reduces transaction costs associated with the 'pure' contractual model 630 currently in place for materials. 631
From the point of view of non-governmental actors involved in conserving and using genetic resources 632 and genomic data, the most straightforward option would be for national governments to undertake to 633 make financial contributions to the BSF on a percentage of seed sales within their borders, without 634 linking the actual incorporation of the genetic resource or the data in new commercialised products. In 635 return, natural and legal persons within their borders could enjoy facilitated access to both crop genetic 636 resources in the multilateral system of ABS and digital genetic sequence data. The system would also 637 not require tracking or tracing of the use of materials or information. National governments could 638 decide whether or not to recoup those costs from their own seed companies. There is a precedent for 639 this model; Norway has adopted the policy of voluntarily making payments to the BSF based on 0.1% of 640 seed sales. In the context of the on-going renegotiations of the ABS conditions of the ITPGRFA's 641 multilateral system, some developing countries and observer organisations have promoted this 642 approach. A number of developed countries have rejected it. Ultimately, in order to avoid the 643 extraordinary complexities that would be associated with a legally binding extension of the contractual 644 model to genome sequence data, it is possible that the practical merits of this approach will be more 645 widely appreciated. 646
Under the Nagoya Protocol, some have argued that it would also be possible to develop similar 647 multilateral ABS arrangements for some classes of genetic resources and related information, though to 648 date, there have not been any concrete initiatives to do so (see Notes S7). 649
Conclusion
650
It will most certainly take several years for the international community to develop mechanisms to 651 address the issues raised in this review, particularly if it is collectively decided that new legally binding 652 agreements (or amendments or protocols to existing legally binding agreements) are necessary. In the 653 meantime, there will be opportunities for interested organisations and networks to develop inclusive 654 forms of governance for the deployment of the new technical capacities discussed in this paper to 655 realise the sustainable development goals. To succeed, broad coalitions of scientists, information 656 technologists, gene bank managers, breeders, farmers and civil society organisations will need to find 657 opportunities to articulate a set of common goals and develop inclusive, transparent, systems for 658 working together. If they are successful, the governance mechanisms, best practices and benefit-sharing 659 standards they develop could positively influence the tone of on-gong intergovernmental negotiations 660 and the form and content of norms that are eventually developed under the aegis of the United Nations. Notes S6 Nagoya Protocol article 10 states: "Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources through this mechanism shall be used to support the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally". It has been suggested (C. Lawson, pers comm) that a multilateral system for genomic sequence data could be modelled on existing copyright collection societies, with payment rates based on uses of sequence data that are estimated by way of on-line searches or audits of final products.
